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Abstract 
We propose a management insulation index based on banks’ charter and by-law provisions and on the 
provisions of the applicable state corporate law that make it difficult for shareholders to oust a bank’s 
management. We show that banks in which managers were more insulated from shareholders in 2003 
were roughly 18 to 26 percentage points less likely to be bailed out in 2008/09. We also find that 
banks in which the management insulation index was reduced between 2003 and 2006 were more 
likely to be bailed out. We discuss alternative interpretations of the evidence. The evidence is mostly 
consistent with the hypothesis that banks in which shareholders were more empowered performed 
poorly during the crisis.  
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One, of several, regulatory responses to the financial crisis has been to consider the extent to 
which bank failure can be explained by flaws in banks’ corporate governance arrangements 
(Kirkpatrick (2009); Walker (2009)). Attention has been paid in particular to the relationship 
between board independence and bank failure (Adams (2012); Beltratti and Stulz (2012); 
Minton, Taillard, and Williamson (2010)). Limited attention has been given to the 
relationship between bank failure and core corporate governance rules that determine the ease 
with which shareholders can remove and replace management (Bruner (2011); Laeven and 
Levine (2009)). In this paper we examine the role played by such rules in mediating the 
different incentives of shareholders and bank managers, and the effect that such rules have on 
the probability of bank bailouts.  
This paper has two main contributions. The first one is the proposal of a measure of the 
extent to which corporate managers are insulated from shareholder pressure. Many corporate 
governance indices first identify a set of relevant legal rules and governance provisions and 
then award scores based on the existence or absence of these legal arrangements (La Porta et 
al (1998); La Porta et al (2006); Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003); Bebchuk, Cohen and 
Ferrell (2009)). This way of indexing, however, ignores the fact that certain governance 
arrangements can be rendered functionally irrelevant by the presence or absence of other 
rules. As the absence or existence of an irrelevant governance provision still has an impact on 
the final score, it adds noise to the final index values. The inclusion of governance provisions 
that as a result of other legal provisions are rendered functionally irrelevant also means that 
similar index scores do not necessarily represent similar outcomes.  
Our measure, which we call the management insulation index (MII), takes a different route. 
Instead of linear indexing, the MII is what could be called a contingent index. Drawing on the 
prior work of Bebchuk, Coates and Subramanian (2002) on effective staggered boards, we 
systematically assess the interaction between different legal rules on the allocation of power 
between shareholders and managers within corporations, also taking into account the 
significant differences in state corporate laws across the US. After filtering out the 
governance arrangements most relevant to our research question, we identify six 
combinations of governance arrangements that can theoretically be considered distinct. Most 
of our index values are the result of different (but functionally equivalent) corporate 
governance arrangements. We detail the construction of the index in Section 1. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2170392
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There are two main advantages of the MII in our setting. First, the MII has a more natural 
interpretation than that of most alternative indices. Second, because of our contingent 
approach to the construction of the index, we expect the MII to be less affected by 
measurement errors. This is particularly important in small-sample settings. This conjecture 
is supported by our evidence. 
Our second and main contribution is to apply this index to show that banks with less insulated 
managers were more likely to receive capital injections under the Capital Purchase Program 
(CPP), the main bank-recapitalization program under the US Troubled Assets Relief Program 
(TARP). Our evidence is based on hand-collected data of the governance arrangements of 
276 banks (for each year in the 2003-2007 period) from the applicable corporation laws and 
the banks’ charters and by-laws.  
We find that measures of management insulation in 2003 are robust predictors of bank 
bailouts in 2008-09. This result is economically and statistically strong, despite the relatively 
small size of our sample. Our most conservative estimate suggests that banks with the highest 
management insulation scores were 18 percentage points less likely to be bailed out than 
banks with the lowest insulation scores. Such a result cannot be replicated with alternative 
measures of shareholder influence, such as ownership concentration, board independence, 
and board classification. Thus, the MII appears to contain information that is not captured by 
these other governance variables. 
Our empirical strategy relies on the fact that governance arrangements in charters, by-laws 
and state corporate laws are very persistent, and thus the governance provisions in place in 
2003 still have significant forecasting power for bank outcomes in 2008-09. To account for 
the possibility of omitted persistent factors, we saturate the empirical model with a number of 
bank characteristics. In particular, we use a flexible specification for bank size and include 
state dummies, as size and state effects are likely to be strong predictors of bailouts. We find 
that, in models with more covariates, the marginal effects of managerial insulation on 
bailouts tend to be stronger. Such a pattern suggests that omitted variables are unlikely to 
explain our findings.  
The fact that governance arrangements in 2003 predict future bailouts does not imply 
causality. But the failure of most observable bank characteristics to predict bailouts suggests 
that omitted variables are unlikely to be the answer. Furthermore, we also find that banks in 
which the management insulation index was reduced between 2003 and 2006 are more likely 
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to be bailed out, which suggests that the evidence cannot be fully explained by fixed bank 
characteristics. Reverse causality stories are also not very plausible given the significant time 
lag between predictor and predicted variables.  
To investigate the mechanism further, we perform a number of additional tests that are aimed 
at differentiating between alternative hypotheses. We consider three leading interpretations of 
the evidence, all of which are interesting. The first one is the possibility that bank 
participation in the CPP is correlated with a bank’s need to recapitalize after finding itself in a 
fragile position during the crisis. Consistent with this view, Bayazitova and Shivdasani 
(2012) show that weaker banks were more likely to apply for CPP equity injections than 
stronger banks were. Similarly, Taliaferro (2009) shows that banks with exposure to troubled 
asset classes were more likely to participate in the CPP. Thus, one interpretation of our 
evidence is that shareholder empowerment leads to decisions that make banks weaker and 
less able to weather crises. 
A second possibility is the exact opposite of the first story: perhaps those banks with high 
management insulation scores were so weak that they did not qualify for government support. 
Duchin and Sosyura (2012) analyze in detail the criteria for selecting CPP participants. Many 
measures of bank strength were considered as a pre-requisite for government investment. If 
banks with high management insulation scores were badly run, they may have been among 
those banks that had their CPP applications rejected. 
A third interpretation is as follows. As CPP equity injections can be seen as a source of cheap 
capital, a decision not to participate in the CPP may be a symptom of poor governance. CPP 
participation came with strings attached, such as restrictions on executive compensation. It is 
possible that powerful executives would prefer not to participate. Cadman, Carter and Lynch 
(2012) show evidence that compensation restrictions affected TARP participation. Thus, 
perhaps when banks are offered the opportunity to recapitalize cheaply, only the well-
governed ones do so. 
The first two stories are mutually exclusive. To address them, we modify our bailout variable 
in the following way. We identify those banks that plausibly did not participate in CPP 
because they were too weak, and treat them as if they had been bailed out. We find that the 
link between the MII variable and the bailout indicator becomes stronger. This finding 
strengthens the first interpretation: shareholder empowerment and bank strength at the 
beginning of the crisis seem to be negatively associated. We also show that banks with high 
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MII were more likely to refuse CPP funds after the investment was approved. This evidence 
is inconsistent with the hypothesis that high MII banks did not receive funds because they 
were weak. The balance of the evidence thus rejects the second story. 
This leaves us with the first and third stories, which are not mutually exclusive. Both stories 
are plausible. Although we cannot perfectly discriminate between them, we offer some 
additional evidence that they are not equally supported by the data. To address the third story, 
we first identify those banks that did not apply for funds, or that received CPP funds but 
repaid them early (before the end of 2009). The latter banks chose to replace cheap 
government capital with more expensive private capital. In particular, banks that exited CPP 
redeemed preferred shares at par, while the fair value of those shares was below par (Wilson 
and Wu (2012)). Thus, similarly to the decision not to participate, exiting CPP early could be 
a symptom of bad governance. However, we find that the link between the MII and CPP 
application (either including or excluding early-repayment banks) is both economically and 
statistically weak. This evidence is difficult to reconcile with the hypothesis that the negative 
relation between the MII and bailouts is mainly due to management’s desire not to be bound 
by the CPP restrictions.  
Why would banks with more empowered shareholders be more likely to be bailed out in a 
banking crisis? One possibility is that governance arrangements influence the extent to which 
bank managers give effect to equity’s risk preferences. As a result of uncosted implicit and 
explicit government guarantees diversified bank shareholders may be incentivized to take 
excessive risks. There are two reasons for this. First, these state guarantees mean that bank 
creditors do not discipline equity’s risk shifting incentives (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). 
Second, there is evidence that in the event of a banking crisis these guarantees make equity 
safer. Kelly, Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2012) provide evidence that government 
guarantees to the financial sector have positive spillover effects on equity holders, and also 
that the implicit bailout promises are priced in the market. Equity holders may thus have 
incentives to take risks that are correlated with the state of the banking sector. It may be that 
in banks in which shareholders are less empowered and therefore less influential executives 
may have more scope to give effect to their own risk preferences which, due to the less 
diversified nature of their human capital investments, are less risk-friendly than those of 
shareholders. 
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To investigate this possibility, we estimate the effects of management insulation on two 
additional variables. The first variable is the proportion of non-interest income in total bank 
income. Brunnermeier, Dong, and Palia (2012) present evidence that banks with higher non-
interest income contribute more to systemic risk than banks that focus more on deposit taking 
and lending. We show that banks with high levels of management insulation in 2003 were 
less likely to increase their non-interest income ratios in the years prior to the crisis (2003-
2006). The second variable is the proportion of Level 3 assets in total assets, which is a 
measure of asset quality (Riedl and Serafeim (2011)). Level 3 assets are illiquid complex 
securities. We find that banks whose governance arrangements insulated them from 
managerial pressure were likely to have a lower proportion of Level 3 assets in 2008 than 
banks that were not as insulated.  
Overall, the evidence suggests that bank holding companies with empowered shareholders 
were more likely to be bailed out partly because they engaged in non-traditional banking 
activities, such as investment banking and trading of complex securities. Such activities are 
plausible sources of correlated risks. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 presents the management insulation index and 
explains its construction. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 presents summary statistics. 
The main empirical results are then presented and discussed in Section 4. Section 5 
concludes. 
1  The Management Insulation Index 
In order to assess the level of managerial insulation of the banks in our sample, we design a 
corporate governance index. The management insulation index (MII) aims at measuring, in 
an objective way, the degree of managers’ exposure to potential strategic intervention by 
activist shareholders.  
1.1 Background and Elements of the MII 
There are two distinctive aspects of corporate law in the United States that are of importance 
for this paper. First, corporate law in the United States is state-based. Each state is a separate 
corporate law jurisdiction. As is well known, Delaware is viewed as the market leader among 
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US states.
2
 Accordingly, when scholars consider 'US corporate law' they typically focus on 
the Delaware corporate code and Delaware case law. While there is significant convergence 
amongst states' corporate law rules - and has been since the early late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 
century when many states followed the lead of the then market leader New Jersey - there are 
many notable differences of approach between states in relation to basic corporate rules, such 
as shareholder rights to call shareholder meetings and to remove directors. These differences 
are of importance in understanding the extent to which managers are insulated from 
shareholder pressure. A presumption of state-wide convergence to the Delaware approach 
will yield an inaccurate assessment of bank managers' insulation from shareholders. For 
example, the consequences of having a classified (or staggered) board
3
 in Delaware are very 
different from the consequences in Florida, Georgia, or California. This aspect seems 
particularly important for the following reason. Although Delaware has clearly established its 
position as the main provider of corporate law, at least for listed companies, its dominance is 
far less pronounced in banking. While 68% of the non-bank constituents of the Russell 3000 
index are incorporated in Delaware as of February 2013, only 21% of our sample banks are 
governed by Delaware corporate law (compared to 22% of the banks in the Russell 3000 
index).
4
 The second distinctive aspect is that many of the core corporate law rules, including 
shareholder rights to remove directors and call shareholder meetings, are optional. This 
contrasts with other common and civil law jurisdictions such as the UK and Germany, where 
such rights are mandatory. It follows that in order to determine how exposed managers are to 
activist shareholder threats and pressure, we cannot simply consider the mandatory and 
default corporate law rules of the state of the bank's incorporation, but need to look at those 
rules in combination with an analysis of the bank's constitutional documents, its charter and 
by-laws. 
Given this variation in banks' shareholder rights and, as a corollary, managerial insulation, to 
understand the state of shareholder empowerment and its effects, we need a way of 
systematically assessing this variation in shareholder rights. The objective of the MII is to 
                                                 
2
 Amongst all Fortune 500 companies, 59% are incorporated in Delaware, which has a 0.3% share of the US 
population; see Bebchuk and Hamdani (2002). 
3
 Meaning that directors (typically) serve three year terms and that only a third of board members stands for re-
election at each annual general meeting. 
 
4
 Percentages calculated based on data contained in the CapitalIQ database. 
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systematize this variation in relation to the sub-set of rights which shareholders can use to 
oust management, or – perhaps more importantly – credibly threaten to do so. It is not our 
aim to create a general corporate governance or shareholder rights index; we exclusively 
focus on answering the question of how core corporate law rules make it more or less 
difficult and time-consuming (and hence costly) to challenge incumbent management.  
We analyze the availability to shareholders of different legal strategies aimed at replacing 
existing management under the applicable state law and the constitutional documents in force 
at the relevant time. A determined and coordinated shareholder body can, in all US 
jurisdictions, ultimately decide on the composition of the board. The differences we identify 
mainly focus on the speed and level of coordination necessary to achieve a change in 
management. The underlying assumption is that time plays an important de facto role in 
insulating managers, as the financial return of shareholder intervention required by activist 
investors will crucially depend on the time horizon of such pay-off.  
The typical linear corporate governance indices first identify a set of relevant legal rules and 
governance provisions and then award scores based on the existence or absence of these legal 
arrangements (La Porta et al (1998); La Porta et al (2006); Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
(2003); Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009)). This way of indexing, however, ignores the fact 
that certain governance arrangements can be rendered functionally irrelevant by the presence 
or absence of other rules and, in particular, that the appearance of insulation created by the 
presence of a staggered board may be misleading when other governance variables are taken 
into account (Bebchuk, Coates and Subramanian (2002)). 
Even providing different numerical weighting to different provisions cannot overcome this 
problem. Apart from the obvious problem of quantifying the relative importance of each legal 
provision, weighting does not address the above concerns since interaction effects necessarily 
imply that the relative “weight” of two governance arrangements is not constant. The MII on 
the other hand is a contingent index in the sense that the presence of each governance 
arrangements only affects the outcome where it can affect manager insulation, taking into 
account all other governance arrangements.
5
 
                                                 
5
 Although ever since Manne’s seminal article (Manne, (1965)) the market for corporate control is typically 
viewed as one of the potentially most powerful corporate governance mechanisms, we do not include here 
measures of entrenchment relating to (hostile) takeovers. The reason for this is that banks, unlike industrial 
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1.2 Distinctiveness and Equivalence of MII values 
Our index takes values from one to six. We identify four main ways in which shareholders 
can gain control over the corporation's board. 
First, where all directors are elected annually, shareholders can simply exercise their voting 
rights to elect different directors.  
Second, many corporations have so-called classified (or staggered) boards, meaning that 
(typically) only a third of all directors stand for re-election each year. In this case, 
shareholders can either wait for two years (two consecutive annual stockholder meetings) in 
order to gain board control, or they can try to ‘declassify’ the board (i.e., changing the bank's 
governance arrangements to switch to annual election of all directors). The former option is 
time-consuming and costly; the availability of the latter option crucially depends on the 
bank's constitutional arrangements set forth in its charter and by-laws, as well as the rules 
determining how the constitution can be amended. In the absence of a contrary provision in 
the bank's charter, shareholders can typically amend a corporation’s by-laws by majority 
vote. Accordingly, if the board's classification is set forth in the by-laws then it can be 
declassified by shareholders alone. However, in some states the charter may impose 
additional restrictions on a by-law amendment including board approval or a supermajority 
shareholder vote. A corporation's charter can only be amended with both board and 
shareholder approval. Accordingly, where board classification is set forth in the charter, de-
classification is only possible with board approval. But note further that where this de-
classification strategy is available it will only be an effective means of gaining board control 
where declassification also results in the application of a “without cause” removal right 
which can be exercised following the declassification,
6
 since the directors' tenure will be 
unaffected by the declassification.
7
 
                                                                                                                                                        
companies, are typically far less exposed to the market for corporate control as the opacity of their balance 
sheets as well as regulatory hurdles provide for significant protection from “disciplining” hostile takeovers 
(Levine (2004)).   
6
 Bylaw changes are effective immediately allowing for further corporate action in the meeting based on that 
change, see, for example, Blasius Industries Inc. v Atlas Corporation 564 A.2d 651. 
7
 This latter assertion – i.e. that the directors' tenure is unaffected by a declassification – is a point of law on 
which there is some uncertainty; for a discussion, see the description of the index in the Appendix.  
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Third, shareholders can elect additional directors to the board and thereby outnumber the 
incumbent directors. The availability of this option again depends on the provisions in the 
charter and by-laws of each corporation and the number of appointed directors: Shareholders 
must first have the right to increase the size of the current board, which differs from bank to 
bank. This depends on the provisions of the charter and by-laws, as well as on the state 
default rules. Moreover, if the charter provides for a maximum board size (as it often does), 
this maximum number must be large enough for the newly appointed directors to be able to 
outnumber the existing board members. In banks with classified boards, this means that the 
maximum board size has to be greater by at least a third than the current board size. Together 
with the third of directors elected annually, this allows shareholders to increase board size to 
the maximum and fill the vacancies created by the expiring directorships to gain (at least) 
50% of the board seats. 
Fourth, shareholders in corporations with both classified and unclassified boards sometimes 
(typically in the case of unclassified boards) have the right to simply remove directors 
“without cause”. 
The chart below (Figure 1) shows the different “paths” leading to each of our six outcomes. 
 
– Insert Figure 1 about here – 
 
We check the availability of each of the above governance arrangements for all banks in our 
sample. Moreover, we also check whether shareholders need to wait for an annual 
stockholder meeting to exercise their control rights. This is the case where shareholders 
neither have the right to call a special (interim) meeting,
8
 nor may “act by written consent”. 
The latter right, available in some corporations, allows shareholders to solicit written consent 
                                                 
8
 Where shareholders do not have to wait for an annual stockholder meeting to exercise their rights, we also 
have to adjust our calculations of the “increase board size”-strategy. As directors’ terms are unaffected by the 
holding of a special meeting, we compare the actual board size with the maximum board size. To illustrate this 
point, take a corporation with a maximum board size of 21, and an actual board size of 12. While shareholders 
could gain control over the board in an annual meeting (where the terms of 4 directors expire, and shareholders 
thus can elect a total of 13 directors), this is not true in a special meeting (where only 9 available seats could be 
filled, leaving the current board in control). Where, as in the above example, control can only be obtained by 
increasing board size coupled with the replacement of the directors whose term expires, banks can only be 
classified as MII  3 or 4 regardless of the existence of a right to call a special meeting.  
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statements from other shareholders and effect decisions within the powers of the general 
meeting without actually holding a meeting.
9
 
This allows us to form three groups of banks where shareholders can, in theory, gain control 
over the bank’s board almost immediately (MII scores of 1 and 2), within a one year (one 
meeting) timeframe (MII scores of 3 and 4), or after a two year (two meeting) timeframe 
(MII scores of 5 and 6). Note that the extent of the managerial insulation in categories 3, 4, 5 
and 6 varies during the year as a function of the length of time to the next annual general 
meeting. This variation is particular pronounced in relation to categories 3 and 4 where the 
timing of the general meeting can vary the insulated time period from between virtually no 
time lag to up to one year. In the Appendix, we describe each index value in detail and the 
“paths” leading to these values. 
2  Data 
Our initial sample consists of 476 US based commercial banks that were publicly listed in 
2008 and for which data were available in the BoardEx database in May 2009. We define 
banks as those companies that held a banking license at the end of 2008. Our sample includes 
all US investment banks that obtained a banking license as part of the 2008 bailout. Our unit 
of analysis is a bank holding company; fully-owned subsidiaries are not included. We then 
exclude all banks that were initially floated after 2003, which reduces our sample to 421 
banks. 
In order to construct the MII, we tried to obtain the articles of incorporation and by-laws 
applicable between 2003 and 2007 for all remaining banks in our sample. We first excluded 
all banks that were not listed throughout the 2003–2007 period. For the remaining banks, the 
documents were hand-collected using the SEC EDGAR database as well as state-based 
document repositories. 
Even though listed companies are in principle required to file with the SEC their articles of 
incorporation as part of their annual reports, we were not able to collect the relevant 
documents for some banks. First, corporations are allowed to incorporate the articles of 
                                                 
9
 In our indexing, we only treat rights to act by written consent (i.e. without a meeting) as equivalent to special 
meeting rights, where its exercise does not depend on the consent of holders of all, or a supermajority of, 
outstanding shares. 
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incorporation and by-laws by reference to prior filings. In many instances, the filings referred 
to were submitted to the SEC before 1994, and are thus unavailable electronically through the 
EDGAR database. This concerns those banks in our sample that did not change their 
articles/by-laws between 1994 and 2007. Second, corporations are not required to restate their 
articles of incorporation or by-laws after each amendment. Consequently, if they choose not 
to consolidate the amendments, and where the original articles/by-laws date from a time prior 
to 1994, a precise re-construction of the corporate governance documents was not always 
possible. We were able to obtain at least partial information for 317 banks, and full sets of all 
constitutional documents for the 2003-2007 timeframe for 276 banks. We collect information 
on the specific governance provisions we identified when constructing the management 
insulation index (see the detailed description in Section 1).  
We obtain bank financial data from Worldscope. We use book assets as proxies for bank size, 
and we measure leverage as assets over common equity. We collect detailed investor level 
ownership data from Bankscope and compensation data for the highest paid director from 
CapitalIQ. We also construct a variable that counts the number of bank acquisitions between 
2003 and 2006. We only include those transactions in which the acquirer achieved full 
control by acquiring at least 50% of the target. For this we use the entire M&A database from 
Thomson One Banker, and match the acquirer’s name against the bank names in our initial 
database per year. We match the acquisitions of subsidiaries to the parent company. We 
construct a banking experience indicator variable that equals one if the director had a prior 
managerial or top-executive position in any bank, and an independence variable based on 
whether a bank director is declared independent. We adjust the independence variable for a 
number of dimensions such as prior employment and material client relationship.
10
 
3  Management Insulation Scores: Summary Statistics 
We assign a score of 1 to 6 to each bank-year from 2003 to 2007, according to the procedure 
described in Figure 1. Table I shows the number of observations in each group. Figure 2 
shows the frequency of each group per year. We find that most banks are either in group 2 
(about 28%) or in group 6 (about 32%). Groups 1 and 4 are also significant (about 15% 
each), but group 3 and 5 are both fairly uncommon. The distribution of management 
                                                 
10
 For an extensive description of the adjustment process, see Ferreira, Kirchmaier, and Metzger (2010). 
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insulation scores is very stable over the years. The reason for this stability is the fact that the 
governance provisions that are used in the construction of the index are rarely modified. In 
some cases, these provisions have been in place for decades. This feature is useful for our 
empirical strategy. 
 
– Insert Table I about here – 
– Insert Figure 2 about here – 
 
How should we aggregate these data? A typical procedure is simply to assign a score of 1 to 6 
to each of these categories. We define such a variable as the management insulation index 
(MII). However, there is no a priori reason to assume that all categories are equally 
important. In fact, we believe that groups 5 and 6 represent a level of management insulation 
that is vastly stronger than all the other levels. Thus, we also create an indicator variable that 
takes the value of one if the management insulation index is equal to five or six, otherwise it 
is zero. We call this variable the management insulation dummy (MID). This variable has a 
straightforward interpretation: it indicates those banks for which it would take two 
consecutive shareholder meetings for a majority coalition of shareholders to gain control of 
the board. In unreported results, we also considered alternative ways of grouping the 
management insulation variables. These variations have no important consequences for our 
conclusions. 
Table II shows the cross-sectional averages of the MII and MID variables per year. It also 
shows the average of a classified board dummy (CBD) variable. If we consider board 
classification (i.e. the existence of a staggered board) as a measure of managerial 
entrenchment, we note that, compared to our management insulation dummy, the classified 
board dummy substantially overestimates the extent to which managers are entrenched. 
While 77% of the boards in our sample are classified in 2003, in only 38% of the banks 
managers are substantially insulated from shareholder pressure, according to our measure. 
The MID variable thus paints a very different picture of management insulation in banks 
from the one suggested by the CBD variable. 
 
– Insert Table II about here – 
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We expect the MID variable to contain different information than that in the CBD. Table III 
shows the percentage of banks that have classified boards, but do not have a management 
insulation index of 5 or 6. Just below 40% of all banks have classified boards and their 
managers are not fully insulated. In fact, it is possible for banks with classified boards to 
achieve very low scores of management insulation. For example, in 2007, 16% of the 
classified-board banks had a management insulation index of 1 and 19.5% of such banks had 
a management insulation index of 2 (results not tabulated).  
 
– Insert Table III about here – 
 
Table IV presents the summary statistics of the main variables used in our empirical analysis 
in Section 4. The unit of observation is a bank-year, thus the maximum sample size is 1267. 
Some variables are however only available for some years. We see from Table IV that about 
56% of the banks in the sample received CPP funds.  
– Insert Table IV about here – 
Table V presents the averages of selected bank variables, conditional on the values of the 
management insulation dummy in 2003. We see that insulated banks were 19 percentage 
points less likely to be bailed out. This difference is statistically significant. The economic 
significance of this effect is substantial, as the unconditional probability of bailout in our 
sample is 56%. That is, a negative relation between management insulation and bailouts 
exists and is quite strong, even before we consider the impact of additional variables on 
bailouts. Management insulation in 2003 is (in part mechanically) correlated to board 
classification in 2006, although this correlation is far from perfect. Insulated banks are larger 
on average (but the median insulated bank is smaller than the median non-insulated bank). 
All the other characteristics are very similar across the two groups.  
 
– Insert Table V about here – 
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4  Empirical Results 
Our goal in this section is to estimate the probability that a bank is bailed out, which is 
measured by the bank’s participation in the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) in 2008-2009. 
To investigate the role of bank characteristics on the probability of bailouts, we estimate the 
following model:  
     (    |  )   (  
  ),  (1) 
where    is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if bank i has received CPP funds,    
is a vector of lagged bank characteristics (as of 2006 or earlier),   is a vector of parameters to 
be estimated, and   is a the standardized normal cumulative distribution function (i.e. a 
Probit model). We do not report the estimates for the vector  ; instead, we always report 
estimated marginal effects evaluated at the means of the data. This means that the reported 
estimates can be readily interpreted and compared. Our results are not sensitive to the Probit 
specification. 
Our main right-hand side variable of interest is the management insulation dummy (MID). As 
we discuss above, the maximum level of insulation (MII=5 or MII=6) is likely to offer 
substantially more protection to managers than all the other levels. As further indication of 
the salience of that insulation level, we note that 38% of the banks in our sample have MII=5 
or MII=6 in 2003. We thus define the MID variable as an indicator variable that takes the 
value of one if MII=5 or MII=6, and zero otherwise. Results in which we use different 
partitions of the MII variable are similar. 
Because of the small size of the sample, we choose a parsimonious set of covariates to be 
included in   . It is well known that larger banks are more likely to be bailed out (the “too big 
to fail” effect), thus it is important to control properly for size. We use (the natural logarithm 
of) the book value of assets as a proxy for size. In order to give more functional-form 
flexibility to the effect of size on bailouts, we run spline regressions in which the effect of 
size on bailouts is allowed to differ according to whether the value of the assets is in one of 
the following three groups: the bottom sextile (the 6-quantile) of the sample, the top sextile, 
or between these two. As it will become clear, this particular specification has no important 
effect on the results. 
Alongside size, in our baseline specification we also include leverage. The reason for 
including leverage is clear: highly-levered banks are more likely to require bailing out. 
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Importantly, we include dummies for the bank’s state of incorporation in some of the 
regressions (there are banks from 38 states in our sample). We want to make sure that our 
results are not simply an artifact of differences in corporate law across states. 
 
4.1 Main Results 
In Table VI we report our first set of results. The table shows the marginal effects of the 
independent variables (evaluated at the means of the data) on the probability of bailouts. We 
report robust z-statistics (clustered by state) within brackets, below the estimated effects. Our 
main variable of interest is the MID variable, which is measured as of 2003 (the earliest date 
for which we have data) in order to minimize concerns about reverse causality. Such a 
strategy is feasible because the MID variable is quite persistent. In column (a) we present the 
result of a univariate probit regression, in which the MID is the only variable on the right-
hand side. We find that banks with insulated managers are 19 percentage points less likely to 
be bailed out. The economic significance of this effect is substantial, as the percentage of 
banks that were bailed out in our sample is 56%. This effect is statistically precise, being 
3.085 standard errors away from zero. This effect is also identical to the 19 percentage point 
effect found in the nonparametric univariate analysis, which is reported in Table V. 
 
– Insert Table VI about here – 
In column (b) we add a first set of controls: size variables and leverage. The effect of the 
MID is basically unchanged. We find that larger banks are indeed more likely to be bailed 
out. The estimated slopes are roughly similar across the three size groups. Indeed, the results 
are basically identical in (unreported) regressions in which size is broken down into a 
different number of groups (either more or fewer groups). Leverage appears to be positively 
related to bailouts. In column (c) we add state dummies. The number of observations is 
reduced because there are ten states with just one bank in the sample. Despite the loss of pure 
cross-state variation, all estimated effects remain roughly unchanged. The statistical precision 
of the estimates falls due to a dramatic reduction in degrees of freedom, but still remains at 
adequate levels. 
In column (d) we include an additional set of control variables: board independence (as a 
proportion of board size), the proportion of independent directors with previous banking 
experience, a 20% block ownership dummy, the ownership stake of the insider with the 
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largest interest in the bank, the number of acquisitions from 2003 to 2006, the fraction of 
variable pay over the total compensation for the highest paid director (which is typically the 
CEO), and (the natural logarithm of) the total compensation for the highest paid director. The 
effect of management insulation on the probability of bailouts is virtually unchanged in this 
specification: banks with insulated managers are 22 percentage points less likely to be bailed 
out. Regarding the other control variables, we note that the effect of leverage is now larger 
and statistically stronger. The number of acquisitions appears to be positively related to 
bailouts. The number of acquisitions is strongly correlated with bank size, and we cannot rule 
out the possibility that its positive effect on bailouts is simply a consequence of the too big to 
fail effect. This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that the inclusion of the acquisition 
variable reduces the statistical precision of the size variables (this is also verified in 
unreported regressions).  
Our preliminary conclusion is that the management insulation dummy is a robust predictor of 
bank bailouts. Its predictive power is not diminished by the inclusion of alternative 
governance variables, such as the presence of large block holders, board independence, board 
experience, and compensation variables. Saturating the model with covariates and state 
dummies has virtually no effect on the estimated marginal effects of management insulation.  
It is important to clarify our interpretation of these results. The evidence shows that our 
measure of shareholder empowerment (the negative of management insulation) in 2003 
predicts bailouts in 2008-09, after controlling for a set of other bank characteristics. It does 
not mean that shareholder interference “caused” the bailouts. First, in general we cannot 
ascertain causality from predictive regressions, as we cannot rule out the possibility that 
charters and by-laws are endogenously determined alongside bank policies that might have 
affected bank performance during the crisis or banks’ incentives to apply for government 
support. Second, in a literal sense, laws, charters and by-laws (or any other governance 
variable) cannot directly cause bank bailouts; bailouts are ultimately determined by some ex 
ante actions by bank executives and some other variables outside their control (i.e. luck, 
politics, etc.). That is, if we could directly observe those ex ante actions and include them in 
our predictive regressions, we would expect the coefficient on the MID variable to be zero. 
Thus, the best one could hope for is to find out whether our management insulation index 
correlates with some of these ex ante actions that led to bank bailouts. The fact that the MID 
variable is a robust predictor of bailouts suggests that shareholder empowerment correlates 
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with a set of ex ante decisions that eventually led to bailouts. We investigate this possibility 
in Subsection 4.3.4 below. 
We next consider the effects of changes in the management insulation index. Such changes 
happen infrequently and are typically a consequence of modifications to the bank’s charter or 
by-laws. In our data, a change in the MII occurs in less than 5% of the bank-years between 
2003 and 2006. We postulate that changes that reduce the management insulation index are 
suggestive of episodes of shareholder activism, either explicit or implicit (for example, by the 
threat of exit – the “Wall Street walk”). We create a variable that measures the changes in the 
MII between 2003 and 2006. We interpret this variable as a proxy for recent shareholder 
interference (that is, negative changes mean that shareholders are more empowered, while 
positive changes mean the opposite). The average change from 2003 to 2006 is just 0.024 
(see Table IV). From 2003 to 2006, we find 23 annual decreases in MII, and 21 annual 
increases in MII (results not tabulated). There are a few cases of major changes, such as from 
1 to 6 and from 6 to 2 (see Table IV). 
Column (e) of Table VI reports the results of a regression using the same specification as in 
column (d), but now including the change in MII as another right-hand side variable. We first 
note that the inclusion of this variable increases the point estimate of the marginal effect of 
MID. In this specification, banks with insulated managers are 26.5 percentage points less 
likely to be bailed out. This effect also appears to be more statistically precise, at roughly 
2.57 standard errors from zero. We also find that the change in MII has a strong effect on the 
probability of bailouts: a one-point reduction in the index increases the probability of a 
bailout by roughly 13 percentage points. This effect is statistically precise, with a z-statistic 
of -2.1. 
We conclude that recent changes in the management insulation index from 2003 to 2006 
contain information that helps explain the cross-section of bank bailouts. This information 
goes beyond that contained in the management insulation dummy in 2003.  
 
4.2 Robustness 
We now discuss some additional robustness checks and offer some more interpretation. 
Although it is impossible to rule out omitted variables as an explanation for our findings, the 
pattern of estimated marginal effects as more controls are added is reassuring. In virtually all 
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cases in Table VI, the inclusion of additional controls tends to make the results stronger (in 
an economic, not statistical sense). Because controls do not seem to make the estimated 
effects weaker, it seems unlikely that by simply adding more controls one could eventually 
find the key missing variable. For omitted variables to explain away the effect of the MID 
variable, we would need to find additional variables that are weakly correlated with the 
controls included in the specifications in Table VI. For example, suppose that we thought that 
bank size could explain the effect of the MID. Our flexible specification for bank size is 
surely still quite imperfect, thus one could make a case for adding more and better proxies for 
size. However, one would need to find an alternative size variable that is only weakly 
correlated with book assets, but strongly correlated with the MID variable. In other words, 
the common factor between such a variable and the MID must be different than the common 
factor among all size variables.  
Substantial research exists on the role of classified boards (also known as staggered boards) 
in entrenching managers.
11
 According to our management insulation index, however, a 
classified board is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a firm achieving the maximum 
score of management insulation. In fact, it is even possible for a firm with a classified board 
to achieve the lowest score of management insulation. In 2003, 39.2% of the banks with 
classified boards had a management insulation index below 5. Still, given the high correlation 
between the MID variable and the board classification dummy, a question arises of whether 
our index is nothing more than a proxy for the simpler board classification dummy.  
In Table VII, we report the output of regressions with the same specifications as those in 
columns (a)-(d) of Table VI, but we now replace the MID variable with the board 
classification dummy. We find that, even after dropping the MID variable from the 
regression, the marginal effects of the classified board variable are both economically and 
statistically insignificant, with the exception of the univariate specification (column (a)), 
where the estimated coefficient is borderline significant. 
 
– Insert Table VII about here – 
                                                 
11
 For examples, see Bebchuk, Coates and Subramanian (2002), Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), Masulis, Wang, 
and Xie (2007), Faleye (2007), Bates, Becher, and Lemmon (2008), and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang (2011). 
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We conjecture that the management insulation dummy is a more precise measure of 
management entrenchment than the board classification dummy. In large samples, the board 
classification dummy may work well, as it is indeed correlated with management 
entrenchment. However, in small samples, such as ours, a less noisy measure is required. The 
management insulation index aims at being more precise than a simple categorization 
between classified and non-classified boards. This additional precision is valuable, not only 
for obtaining statistically significant results in small samples, but, crucially, for obtaining 
economically meaningful estimates in samples of any size. 
There is evidence linking board structure to bank performance during the crisis (for some 
examples, see Adams, (2012); Beltratti and Stulz, (2012); Erkens, Hung, and Matos, (2012); 
Chesney, Stromberg, and Wagner, (2012); and Minton, Taillard, and Williamson, (2010)). In 
particular, a positive relation between board independence and bank bailouts is found in 
Adams (2012) and Minton, Taillard, and Williamson (2010). As we see from Table VI, the 
effect of board independence on the probability of bailouts is small and statistically 
insignificant. We conjecture that board independence is a noisy proxy for shareholder 
empowerment. As such, its effect in our sample is likely to be small, either because our 
sample is small or because the management insulation dummy is a more precise proxy for 
(less) shareholder empowerment, or both.  
 
4.3 Investigating the Mechanism 
As discussed in the introduction, there are three leading explanations for the negative relation 
between management insulation and the probability of bailouts. First, management insulation 
may be correlated with decisions that made banks stronger during the crisis, leading to fewer 
bailouts. Second, management insulation may be correlated with decisions that made banks 
weaker during the crisis, and because of such weakness, such banks did not qualify for CPP 
investments. Third, insulated managers may have chosen not to apply for bailout funds. Here 
we investigate each of these explanations in turn to see whether they survive further scrutiny. 
 
4.3.1 Management Insulation and Bank Performance 
Banks with serious liquidity needs had no option but to apply for CPP funds. However, 
participation in CPP is a less reliable indicator of bank performance during the crisis where 
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reasons other than financial necessity played a role in banks’ decisions to accept a bailout. A 
particular concern is that large banks that were considered systemically important by 
government regulators may have had little choice but to accept CPP funds, regardless of 
whether managers felt that their institutions needed a bailout. To address this concern, 
column (a) of Table VIII reports the output of additional regressions in which we exclude the 
largest sextile (by 2006 book assets) from our sample. Following the exclusion of this group 
the MID remains a robust predictor of bailouts.  
If managers of strong banks, due to pressure from the regulator or otherwise, accepted CPP 
funds, such managers were incentivized to exit CPP as early as possible in order to avoid the 
restrictions on executive compensation linked to CPP participation (Bayazitova and 
Shivdasani (2012)). Accordingly, omitting banks that took and repaid CPP funds within a 
year following the commencement of the program is likely to exclude from our sample many 
of the banks that took CPP funds for reasons other than financial necessity. 
In column (b) of Table VIII, we report the output of regressions excluding banks that repaid 
early. Finally in column (c) of Table VIII we exclude both of these groups. Following the 
exclusion of both these groups the MID remains a robust predictor of bailouts. In additional 
unreported regressions we group the banks that repaid early together with the banks that did 
not receive any CPP funds; this regrouping has no significant impact on our results.  
 
– Insert Table VIII about here – 
 
Note also that the membership in the two groups excluded in (a) and (b) is highly correlated: 
50% of the largest sextile of our sample banks had entirely repaid the received CPP funds by 
October 2009, while only roughly 10% of the remaining banks had done so. This also 
supports the hypothesis that some of the largest institutions in our sample participated in CPP 
because of their systemic importance and not because of financial necessity.  
Furthermore, some banks which had serious liquidity difficulties did not qualify for CPP 
capital injections or had their applications rejected because they were too weak (Bayazitova 
and Shivdasani, (2012); Duchin and Sosyura, (2012)). Our bailout indicator is at best a noisy 
proxy for performance/liquidity needs, because some of the worst-performing banks did not 
receive CPP funds. 
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To address the concern that our bailout dummy is a poor proxy for bank weakness, or perhaps 
worse, that it might be a proxy for bank strength, we first identify those banks that did not 
receive funds because they were too weak. These are banks that were closed by the FDIC 
shortly after the CPP was announced, or banks that stated that they could not issue preferred 
shares because they had already defaulted/delayed payment on subordinated debt, or there 
were other clear reasons for not receiving funds due to weakness. There are 14 banks in this 
category. We also identify 8 banks that did not receive funds and subsequently failed (as of 
2010). We then create two new indicator variables. The first one, which we call “bailout + 
weak bank dummy,” is equal to 1 if a bank either is bailed out or is weak but is not bailed 
out. The second variable, which we call “bailout + weak + failed banks,” is equal to the first 
one except that it also includes the failed banks in the group of bailed out and weak banks. 
These two new variables are arguably less noisy proxies for poor performance. 
In Table IX, columns (a) and (b), we report the output of regressions using the same 
specification as in column (e) of Table VI (which is the one with the largest set of controls), 
but replacing the bailout variable with these two different indicator variables. We find that 
the results become stronger. Now those banks with MID=1 are about 33 to 35 percentage 
points less likely to be poor performers.  
– Insert Table IX about here – 
As these results are directly comparable to those from Table VI, the evidence here supports 
an interpretation in which management insulation may have made some banks stronger.  
 
4.3.2 Management Insulation and Incentives to Apply for CPP funds 
The negative relation between management insulation and the acceptance of CPP funds could 
be explained by badly-governed banks choosing not to apply for these funds. In that case, we 
expect the negative relation between management insulation and the decision to apply for 
CPP funds to be even stronger than that between management insulation and bailouts. To test 
this hypothesis, we create an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if a bank applied for 
CPP funds. We assume that all banks that received CPP funds applied for them. Of the 
remaining banks, we identify 34 banks that did apply for the funds, but did not get them. This 
information comes from the banks’ company reports, such as 10-Ks, annual reports, or 
documents on their web pages. 
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From Table IX, column (c), we see that the MID variable has a negative effect on the 
probability of applying for funds. This effect is, however, economically smaller than that of 
the bailout variable and is statistically imprecise. Empirically, this result is explained by the 
fact that a large number of banks that applied for CPP funds, but did not get them, had the 
highest insulation scores (MII=5 or 6). This evidence is difficult to reconcile with an 
interpretation in which badly-governed banks choose not to apply for bailout funds. 
Some banks that received CPP funds exited from the program very early. An early exit could 
also be a symptom of bad governance. Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012) show evidence that 
banks with high levels of CEO compensation were more likely to exit CPP early. Wilson and 
Wu (2012) argue that there was no compelling economic reason to repay CPP investments 
early, leaving open the possibility that badly-governed banks chose to exit the program 
against the interests of their shareholders. To address this possibility, we identify 23 banks 
that received CPP funds but repaid these funds at or before October 2009. We use this 
information to refine our CPP application dummy, which now classifies those banks that 
exited early in the same group as those that did not apply. We report the results in Table IX, 
column (d). The estimated effect of the MID variable on the probability of applying for funds 
and not repaying them early is economically weaker than that reported in column (c), and its 
statistical precision is weak. 
 
4.3.3 Management Insulation and Rejection of CPP funds 
The strong correlation between management insulation and the probability of receiving CPP 
is not fully explained by the decision to apply for CPP funds. Thus, it is likely that some 
banks with MID=1 applied for CPP funds, but did not get them. There are two main reasons 
for a bank not to receive CPP funds, conditional on applying for such funds. As discussed 
above, some banks were too weak to qualify for such funds. But we already know from 
column (a) that MID=1 banks were less likely to be denied funds because they were weak. 
Alternatively, some banks had their applications approved, but rejected the CPP investments. 
The latter banks were relatively strong, as evidenced by the approval of funds and the fact 
that they believed that they could go on without such funds.  
In column (e) of Table IX we estimate the probability of rejecting CPP funds, conditional on 
approval. The sample is restricted to those banks that had their applications approved. We 
find that banks with MID=1 are 27.6 percentage points more likely to reject CPP funds after 
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approval. This result again casts doubt on the hypothesis that banks with insulated managers 
did not receive funds because they were weak. However, the regression in column (e) is not 
able to separate between the main two competing hypotheses (the first story and the third 
story), as rejecting CPP funds may not only be an indicator of strength, but also a symptom of 
bad governance. 
Overall, the evidence in Table IX is quite compelling. The negative correlation between 
management insulation and bailouts is mostly driven by a combination of low-insulation 
banks being weak, and thus not receiving CPP funds (columns (a) and (b)), and high-
insulation banks being sufficiently strong to reject CPP funds (column (e)). On the other 
hand, the decision to apply for CPP funds explains only a small part of the results. We 
conclude that the data support the hypothesis that management insulation is correlated with 
decisions that made banks stronger during the crisis. There is very little support for the 
alternative hypothesis that the management insulation index works as a proxy for badly-
governed banks that choose not to raise cheap government capital. 
 
4.3.4 Bank Scope: Income and Asset Composition 
If management insulation is related to different choices in the period before the crisis, what 
are these choices? Here we investigate the relation between management insulation and some 
accounting variables that might be informative about bank choices prior to the crisis. 
Using accounting data to assess pre-CPP bank strength is problematic. Accounting data such 
as leverage ratios are likely to be an opaque and noisy measure of the risk of a bank’s asset 
profile, as such ratios are not informative about the risk attributes of the asset portfolio itself. 
Likewise, even risk-based capital ratios as measures of bank strength or solvency are 
similarly opaque and noisy due to their regulatory use,
12
 and because their calculation, pre-
crisis, was based on assumptions that were proven incorrect by the ensuing financial crisis.
13
 
                                                 
12
See section 38 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act and section 325.103 of the FDIC Rules and 
Regulations (12 C.F.R. § 325.103). For investment bank conglomerates, see the voluntary regime under the 
Supervised Investment Bank Holding Company Rules (now repealed), 17 CFR § 240.17i–7. 
13
For example, in the last Form 10-Q Lehman Brothers filed before its bankruptcy (Q2 2008), its reported Total 
Risk-Based Capital Ratio exceeded the equivalent figures reported by both JPMorgan Chase and Goldman 
Sachs. 
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In unreported regressions, we find only weak evidence of associations between management 
insulation and traditional proxies for risk and performance, such as leverage, accounting 
performance, stock market performance, non-performing loans, and measures of volatility 
prior to the crisis.
14
 
We next investigate the relation between management insulation and variables related to bank 
scope. The first variable that we consider is the ratio of non-interest income over net interest 
income. Non-interest income is a (possibly noisy) measure of a commercial bank’s focus on 
noncore activities, such as investment banking and trading. Brunnermeier, Dong, and Palia 
(2012) argue that banks with higher non-interest income ratios contribute more to systemic 
risk than banks that focus more on deposit taking and lending. They also show that banks 
have increased their non-interest income ratios in the years prior to the crisis; the largest 
increases happened between 2000 and 2003. However, in their sample – as well as in ours – 
the average non-interest income ratio decreases between 2003 and 2006 (see our Table IV 
and Brunnermeier et al’s Figure 1).  
In Table X we consider the correlations between bank characteristics in 2003 and the 
subsequent change in non-interest income ratios. The dependent variable is the log of the 
2006 non-interest income ratio divided by the 2003 non-interest income ratio: 
               (
                   
                   
)
  
    (
                   
                   
)
  
                   (2) 
We use the same variables as before as covariates. The size of the sample falls because of 
missing data. We find that banks with the highest management insulation scores (MID=1) 
experienced larger reductions in their non-interest ratios than those banks with low 
management insulation scores. To understand the economic significance of these results, 
consider for example the point estimate of -0.21 in the first row of column (a) (Table X). This 
coefficient roughly means that, compared to an otherwise identical low-insulation bank with 
                                                 
14
 The literature on TARP offers some contradictory evidence on the relation between bailouts and bank 
performance. For example, Ng, Vasvari, and Wittenberg-Moerman (2011) show that banks that participated in 
the CPP experienced lower stock returns relative to nonparticipants during the CPP initiation period. However, 
CPP participants appeared to have stronger fundamentals than nonparticipants. The authors interpret this finding 
as evidence that the market irrationally perceived CPP participation as bad news. However, it is also possible to 
reinterpret these findings as consistent with a view in which accounting data from banks are noisy, and that the 
market learns about important soft information from CPP participation. As troubled banks indeed improve after 
receiving CPP funds, eventually their valuations go back in line with those of nonparticipants. 
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no change in its non-interest income ratio, a high-insulation bank would have decreased its 
non-interest income ratio by 21%. From Table IV, we see that the average (log) change in NII 
between 2006 and 2003 is -23.2%. Thus, the estimates suggest that a large fraction of the 
decrease in NII comes from banks with high management insulation scores. 
 
– Insert Table X about here – 
 
Next, we consider Level 3 assets (L3 assets) as an alternative measure of a bank’s focus on 
less traditional banking activities. L3 assets are assets, such as financial instruments (SFAS 
133, 2008), that are reported at fair value determined through the application of a financial 
model for which there are no observable market inputs (SFAS 157, 2006). We postulate that 
a bank’s L3 assets as a percentage of its total assets is indicative of the extent of the bank’s 
focus on trading of complex, opaque and illiquid securities. We take L3 assets from the 
financial statements for the financial years beginning after November 15, 2007, the first year 
that US GAAP required the reporting of this information. Importantly, this financial year end 
is the closest in time to the implementation of the CPP program, which was announced on 
October 14, 2008. 
A caveat about the reliability of these accounting data must be considered when interpreting 
the results we report below. Regulators have expressed doubts about the ability of auditors to 
operate effectively in relation to Level-3 fair value accounting. In the absence of any 
observable market inputs, auditors may be over-reliant upon, or lack the capacity to 
challenge, management’s determination of the applicable valuation model and on the selected 
inputs and assumptions.
15
 Accordingly, there is a risk that the audit will not operate as a 
robust check on reporting distortions resulting from managerial preferences (PCAOB 2008). 
This could result in either the overvaluation (delay in write downs) of L3 assets in weak 
banks (Vyas (2011)) or their undervaluation in strong banks interested in future earnings 
management. Paradoxically, however, to the extent that these respective distortions are 
applicable in weak and strong banks, they may operate as unintended indicators of weakness 
                                                 
15
 See ‘PCAOB: Can Auditors Handle Fair Value?’ CFO.com reporting the concerns of the Chairman of the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board about the auditing of fair value accounting entries (available at: 
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/9319788/c_9320361). 
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and strength, with weak banks reporting a higher percentage of total assets than would be the 
case under conditions of effective auditing and strong banks reporting a lower percentage.
16
 
Table XI reports the results of regressions in which the percentage of L3 assets is regressed 
on the management insulation dummy and a number of other bank characteristics. We find 
that banks with MID=1 in 2003 end up with less 0.512 percentage points in L3 assets in 2008 
than banks with MID=0 (see column (a)). This effect is economically strong: the average 
percentage of L3 assets in our sample is 0.56% and the standard deviation is 1.26% (see 
Table IV). One caveat here is that about half of the banks used in column (a) had no L3 assets 
(116 out of 240). The OLS regression in column (a) is thus necessarily misspecified. In 
column (b) we then ask a different question: Does the MID affect the percentage of L3 assets 
among those banks with nonzero L3 assets? The answer is yes. The results are now 
statistically weaker, but this is to be expected because the sample has been halved. The point 
estimate of -0.771 of the coefficient on the MID variable translates into a marginal effect of -
0.428 percentage points, for a bank with the average amount of L3 assets (0.56%).  
 
– Insert Table XI about here – 
 
The evidence in this subsection is only suggestive, thus our conclusions are tentative. Banks 
with high management insulation scores appear to have been focused more on traditional 
commercial banking activities (deposit taking and lending) than those banks with low 
management insulation scores. Such a difference in the scope of bank activities is reflected in 
the different levels of non-interest income ratios and L3 assets. 
5  Final Remarks 
One of the main contributions of this paper is to illustrate the usefulness of interpretable 
corporate governance indices. We develop an index of management insulation from 
shareholder pressure, which we call the management insulation index (MII). The MII is an 
                                                 
16
 Existing research suggests that the Level-3 assets variable contains useful information. Riedl and Sarafeim 
(2011) consider level-three assets as a proxy for information risk. Lev and Zhou (2009) find that investors have 
a strong adverse reaction to liquidity constraining events as a function of a bank's level-two and level three 
assets. 
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attempt to answer the question of how core corporate law rules make it more or less difficult 
and time-consuming to replace incumbent management. We show that this index contains 
information that is useful for predicting bank bailouts during the crisis. Going forward, we 
note that the methodology that we develop to construct the index is not specific to financial 
firms. This methodology may prove useful in future studies on the costs and benefits of 
shareholder empowerment. 
The results presented in the paper suggest that banks whose managers enjoyed a higher 
degree of insulation from shareholder pressure were less reliant on state bailouts than banks 
whose managers were subject to stronger shareholder rights. One explanation of these results 
could be that banks that were poorly governed as a result of weaker shareholder discipline 
may have elected not to participate in the CPP, in order to avoid the restrictions imposed by it 
and in particular the restrictions placed on executive compensation. The data provide only 
weak support for such an explanation, although we cannot rule it out. Overall, the evidence in 
this paper is consistent with the hypothesis that banks in which managers enjoyed a higher 
degree of insulation from shareholder pressure were more able to survive without government 
support. 
We posit that an explanation can be found in the relationship between bank scope, 
shareholder pressure, and governance arrangements. Bank shareholders may have incentives 
to increase risk taking beyond the socially-optimal level. There are two reasons for this. First, 
the well-known risk-shifting incentives that create conflicts between creditors and 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). In an efficient debt market, the debt holder will 
require an increased return or contractual safeguards to compensate him for the increase in 
the risk of default. However, in this regard banks and financial institutions are fundamentally 
different from non-financial corporations. Although sophisticated debt providers may be 
capable of incorporating variation in the risk profile of banks into the price of their credit, 
there might be no reason for them to do so. Sovereigns provide explicit and implicit 
guarantees to bank lenders. The explicit guarantees typically take the form of deposit 
insurance up to a pre-specified amount of deposits (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002)). 
Second, these implicit and explicit state guarantees also have direct positive spill-over effects 
for equity holders (Kelly, Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh 2012). 
It is thus possible that, in search for higher returns, bank shareholders had incentives to push 
their banks towards less traditional banking activities. Such a push may have encountered 
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some resistance from bank managers. A bank manager’s human capital, reputational capital, 
private benefits of control, and financial capital are typically highly undiversified. An 
increase in the risk profile of the bank results in an increase in the probability of losses for the 
manager in all of these capital categories, but particularly the first three categories which 
cannot be diversified at all. 
Accordingly, shareholders with strong incentives to pursue high-yield activities may face 
managers who have a preference for more traditional banking activities. Shareholders who 
cannot successfully persuade or incentivize managers to alter the bank’s strategy may resort 
to more forceful persuasion: they may threaten managers with removal or loss of control if 
they fail to implement the shareholders’ preferred investment policy. The extent to which any 
such threat is a credible one is a function of the basic corporate law rules governing a bank, 
and the extent to which such rules enable an active investor to take control of the bank away 
from those managers. We would thus expect banks with a low MII score to adopt more 
aggressive investment strategies, and to be more likely to fail than banks with a high MII 
score. 
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Table I – Management Insulation Scores 2003-2007 
This table shows the number of US commercial banks in each of the six management insulation 
scores described in Figure 1. Sample size (276) is determined by the availability of constitutional 
documents for the entire 2003-2007 timeframe and other bank characteristics that are used in our 
analysis.  
 
Insulation score Year 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
1 41 40 37 34 36 
2 72 74 76 79 83 
3 20 17 18 21 18 
4 40 42 44 41 39 
5 17 15 14 13 12 
6 86 88 87 88 88 
      
Total 276 276 276 276 276 
 
Table II – Management Insulation Variables and Board Classification: 
Average Values 2003-2007 
This table shows cross–sectional average values per year of the management insulation index 
(MII), the management insulation dummy (MID), and the board classification dummy (BCD). The 
MII variable classifies each bank into one of the six insulation scores described in Figure 1 and, in 
more details, in the Appendix. The MID variable equals 1 if MII=5 or MII=6, and zero otherwise. 
The BCD variable equals 1 if the bank has a classified board and zero otherwise. The sample size 
is 276 in each year. 
 
Year Variable 
 Management Insulation 
Index - MII 
Management Insulation 
Dummy - MID 
Board Classification 
Dummy -BCD 
2003 3.64 0.38 0.77 
2004 3.66 0.38 0.77 
2005 3.66 0.37 0.76 
2006 3.67 0.37 0.75 
2007 3.62 0.37 0.73 
 
 
 
Table III – Classified-board Banks with Low Insulation Scores 
This table shows the percentage of banks for which the board classification dummy equals 1 and 
the management insulation dummy equals zero. 
 
 Year 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Percentage 39.5% 39.9% 39.1% 38.4% 36.6% 
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Table IV – Bank Characteristics: Summary Statistics 
This table shows the summary of some bank characteristics. The bailout dummy equals 1 if the bank received 
CPP funds in 2008-09. The change in management insulation variable is the change in the MII variable from 
2003 to 2006. Bailed out or weak banks corrects the bailout dummy by adding those banks that were too weak 
to receive CPP funds. Bailed out or weak banks or failed banks further corrects that dummy by adding banks 
that subsequent failed. Applied for CPP is a dummy for banks that applied to the CPP program, and Applied for 
CPP and no early repayment adjusts that variable by correcting for banks that repaid early. Approved, but 
rejected CPP is a dummy variable indicating those banks that rejected CPP after having been approved. The 
number of acquisitions 2003-2006 is the count of control stakes (>50%) acquired in other banks from 2003 to 
2006 inclusive. All the other variables are for bank-years between 2003 and 2007. The classified board dummy 
equals 1 if the bank has a classified board. Book value of assets is measured in millions of US dollars. Leverage 
is the book value of assets divided by the book value of total equity. ROE is net income over equity. Board 
independence is the proportion of independent directors on the board. Board directors’ banking experience is 
the proportion of independent directors with previous managerial experience in the banking industry. The block 
ownership dummy (20%) indicates the presence of at least one shareholder with an ownership stake of 20% or 
more. Inside owner (in %) denotes the ownership stake of the insider with the largest interest in the bank. HPD 
denotes the highest paid director in a bank, typically the CEO. Change in Non-Interest Income is the change of a 
banks’ log-ratio of non-interest income to net interest income between 2003 and 2006. L3 Assets is the 
percentage of Level 3 assets over all assets. 
 
 Summary Statistics 
Variable  mean st. dev. min max n 
Bailout dummy  0.560 0.497 0 1 1267 
Change in management insulation (2003-06)  0.024 0.748 -4 5 1267 
Bailed out or weak banks  0.610 0.488 0 1 1267 
Bailed out or weak banks or failed banks  0.637 0.481 0 1 1267 
Applied for CPP  0.679 0.467 0 1 1267 
Applied for CPP and no early repayment  0.592 0.492 0 1 1267 
Approved, but rejected CPP  0.090 0.286 0 1 1267 
Classified board dummy  0.757 0.429 0 1 1267 
Book assets  23,184 135,195 76 1,715,746 1267 
Leverage  11.384 3.290 2.512 38.307 1267 
ROE  0.106 0.065 -0.622 0.391 1267 
Number of acquisitions (2003-06)  2.114 5.273 0 52 1267 
Board independence  0.735 0.134 0 0.944 1267 
Board directors’ banking experience  0.181 0.159 0 0.800 1267 
Block ownership dummy (20%)  0.088 0.284 0 1 1267 
Inside owner  2.547 6.075 0 50.030 636 
HPD variable pay (as fraction of total pay)  0.241 0.224 0 1 1231 
Total HPD pay (in thousands)  1,632 4,414 18 54,000 1230 
Change in Non-Interest Income (2003-06)  -0.232 0.429 -1.977 1.177 919 
L3 Assets (2008)  0.556 1.262 0 8.292 1128 
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Table V – Bank Characteristics: Sample Averages Conditional on 
Management Insulation in 2003 
This table shows the sample averages of selected bank characteristics in 2006, conditional on the 2003 value of 
the management insulation dummy (MID). The bailout dummy equals 1 if the bank received CPP money in 
2008-09. The number of acquisitions 2003-2006 is the count of control stakes (>50%) acquired in other banks 
from 2003 to 2006 inclusive. All the other variables are from 2006. The classified board dummy equals 1 if the 
bank had a classified board in 2006. Book value of assets is measured in millions of US dollars. Leverage is the 
book value of assets divided by the book value of total equity. Return on equity (ROE) is net income over 
common equity. Board independence is the fraction of independent directors on the board. Board directors’ 
banking experience is the fraction of independent directors with previous managerial experience in the banking 
industry. The block ownership dummy (20%) indicates the presence of at least one shareholder with an 
ownership stake of 20% or more. Inside owner (in %) denotes the ownership stake of the insider with the largest 
interest in the bank. 
 
 Average Values Conditional on MID 
Variable  MID = 0 MID = 1 
Bailout dummy  0.62 0.43 
Classified board dummy  0.62 0.97 
Book assets (mean)  23,535 26,034 
Book assets (median)  1,554 1,038 
Leverage  11.05 11.14 
Return on Equity (ROE)  11.08 9.97 
Number of acquisitions 2003-2006  1.58 1.84 
Board independence  0.76 0.72 
Board directors’ banking experience  0.17 0.19 
Block ownership dummy (20%)  0.09 0.10 
Inside owner  7.69 7.43 
    
Number of observations  172 104 
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Table VI – Marginal Effects of Management Insulation on the Probability of Bailouts (2008/09) 
This table shows results of Probit regressions of bank bailouts on bank characteristics. The sample consists of all US banks for which data are available. The dependent 
variable – the bailout dummy – is equal to one if the bank received CPP money in 2008-09. The management insulation dummy (MID) is from 2003. The change in 
management insulation variable is the change in the MII variable from 2003 to 2006. The small size dummy indicate banks in the lowest sextile (6-quantile) of the sample 
size distribution, as measure by book assets, the large size dummy indicate banks in the top sextile, and the medium size dummy indicates banks in between the bottom and 
the top sextiles. See Table IV for the definition of variables. All control variables are from 2006, unless otherwise stated. HPD denotes the highest paid director in a bank, 
typically the CEO. Robust standard errors are clustered at state level. The reported coefficients represent marginal effects evaluated at the means of the data. Robust z-
statistics are in brackets. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels. 
 
Independent Variable   Dependent Variable: Bailout dummy 
   (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
Management Insulation Dummy-MID (2003)   -0.191*** -0.182** -0.201** -0.221** -0.265** 
   [-3.085] [-2.215] [-2.036] [-2.004] [-2.573] 
Change in management insulation (2003-06)       -0.130** 
       [-2.103] 
Log assets times small size dummy    0.078 0.130 0.105 0.111 
    [1.410] [1.550] [0.809] [0.842] 
Log assets times medium size dummy    0.093** 0.149** 0.127 0.135 
    [2.196] [2.153] [1.097] [1.134] 
Log assets times large size dummy    0.094*** 0.135** 0.107 0.113 
    [2.883] [2.482] [1.062] [1.096] 
Leverage    0.019** 0.023** 0.040*** 0.039*** 
    [2.034] [2.074] [3.857] [4.099] 
Board independence      0.066 0.066 
      [0.198] [0.189] 
Board directors’ banking experience       0.158 0.099 
      [0.706] [0.445] 
Block ownership dummy (20%)      -0.100 -0.076 
      [-0.741] [-0.528] 
Inside owner      -0.002 -0.002 
      [-0.438] [-0.618] 
Number of acquisitions 2003-2006      0.041* 0.039* 
      [1.833] [1.704] 
HPD variable pay (as fraction of total pay)      0.129 0.154 
      [0.486] [0.543] 
Log total HPD pay      -0.030 -0.037 
      [-0.312] [-0.368] 
State dummies   No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations   276 276 266 248 248 
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Table VII – Bailouts and Board Classification 
This table shows results of Probit regressions of bank bailouts on bank characteristics. The sample consists of all 
US banks for which data are available. The dependent variable – the bailout dummy – is equal to one if the bank 
received CPP money in 2008-09. The classified board dummy (CBD) is from 2003. The small size dummy 
indicate banks in the lowest sextile (6-quantile) of the sample size distribution, as measure by book assets, the 
large size dummy indicate banks in the top sextile, and the medium size dummy indicates banks in between the 
bottom and the top sextiles. See Table IV for the definition of variables. Standard errors are clustered on state 
level. The reported coefficients represent marginal effects evaluated at the means of the data. Robust z-statistics 
are in brackets. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels. 
 
Independent Variable   Dependent Variable: Bailout dummy 
   (a) (b) (c) (d) 
Classified board dummy – CBD (2003)   -0.121* -0.070 -0.087 -0.145 
   [-1.745] [-0.965] [-0.847] [-1.396] 
Log assets times small size dummy    0.085 0.148* 0.129 
    [1.634] [1.928] [1.131] 
Log assets times medium size dummy    0.099** 0.164** 0.147 
    [2.433] [2.544] [1.402] 
Log assets times large size dummy    0.098*** 0.147*** 0.122 
    [2.972] [2.836] [1.324] 
Leverage    0.020** 0.024** 0.041*** 
    [2.078] [2.039] [4.385] 
Board independence      0.162 
      [0.492] 
Board directors’ banking experience      0.098 
      [0.435] 
Block ownership dummy (20%)      -0.082 
      [-0.585] 
Inside owner      -0.002 
      [-0.445] 
Number of acquisitions (2003-06)      0.041* 
      [1.848] 
HPD variable pay (as fraction of total pay)      0.075 
      [0.289] 
Log total HPD pay      -0.022 
      [-0.220] 
State dummies   No No Yes Yes 
Observations   276 276 266 248 
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Table VIII – Reduced Sample: Excluding Largest Banks and Early 
Repayers 
 
This table shows results of Probit regressions of bank bailouts on bank characteristics for a reduced sample size. 
The regression in column (a) excludes the largest sextile (6-quantile) of the sample size distribution, as 
measured by 2006 book assets; column (b) excludes all banks that repaid the government funds received in full 
by October 2009; in column (c) the “early repayer group” (as in column (a)) and the largest sextile of our 
sample are both excluded. The reported coefficients represent marginal effects evaluated at the means of the 
data. Robust standard errors are clustered on state level. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), 
and 0.10 (*) levels. 
 
 
Independent Variable  Dependent Variable: Bailout dummy 
 (a) (b) (c) 
Management Insulation Dummy-MID (2003) -0.286** -0.237** -0.256** 
 [-2.391] [-2.065] [-2.160] 
Change in management insulation (2003-06) -0.158** -0.126* -0.147** 
 [-2.365] [-1.956] [-2.170] 
Log assets times small size dummy 0.140 0.094 0.117 
 [1.107] [0.612] [0.908] 
Log assets times medium size dummy 0.160 0.113 0.134 
 [1.388] [0.808] [1.144] 
Log assets times large size dummy  0.083  
  [0.660]  
Leverage 0.057*** 0.045*** 0.059*** 
 [3.414] [4.293] [3.608] 
Board independence 0.021 0.068 0.065 
 [0.050] [0.167] [0.151] 
Board directors’ banking experience 0.100 0.132 0.151 
 [0.467] [0.554] [0.708] 
Block ownership dummy (20%) 0.123 -0.047 0.128 
 [0.752] [-0.328] [0.797] 
Inside owner -0.007 -0.002 -0.006 
 [-1.276] [-0.604] [-1.179] 
Number of acquisitions 2003-2006 -0.001 0.043* -0.001 
 [-0.048] [1.646] [-0.033] 
HPD variable pay (as fraction of total pay) 0.116 0.011 0.067 
 [0.351] [0.037] [0.199] 
Log total HPD pay 0.039 0.033 0.071 
 [0.243] [0.256] [0.434] 
    
State dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 207 224 192 
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Table IX – Bailouts, Bank Strength, and the Decision to Participate 
This table shows results of Probit regressions of five different indicator variables on bank characteristics. The dependent variables are: (a) banks that received CPP funds in 
2008-09 or did not receive funds because they were too weak, (b) the same as in (a) plus all banks that failed up to 2010, (c) banks that applied for CPP funds, (d) the same as 
in (c) but without those banks that repaid funds before October 2009, and (e) banks that rejected CPP for a subsample of banks that did apply and were approved for CPP. All 
the other variables are as in Table VI. Robust standard errors are clustered on state level. The reported coefficients represent marginal effects evaluated at the means of the 
data. The fraction of banks meeting the criteria is for: (a) 0.598, (b) 0.627, (c) 0.670, (d) 0.587 and (e) 0.141. Robust z-statistics are in brackets. Asterisks indicate 
significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels. 
 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable 
 
(a) Bailed out or weak 
banks 
(b) Bailed out or weak 
banks or failed banks 
(c) Applied for CPP 
(d) Applied for CPP and 
no early repayment 
(e) Approved, but 
rejected 
Management Insulation Dummy -MID (2003) -0.353*** -0.329*** -0.116 -0.067 0.276*** 
[-3.611] [-3.438] [-1.553] [-0.811] [3.121] 
Change in management insulation (2003-06) -0.102** -0.093** -0.097* -0.062 0.106** 
[-2.113] [-1.982] [-1.757] [-1.058] [2.197] 
Log assets times small size dummy 0.061 0.048 0.114 0.046 0.006 
[0.491] [0.395] [1.076] [0.373] [0.081] 
Log assets times medium size dummy 0.091 0.076 0.128 0.060 -0.020 
[0.839] [0.732] [1.377] [0.562] [-0.301] 
Log assets times large size dummy 0.076 0.061 0.103 0.033 -0.018 
[0.801] [0.687] [1.319] [0.382] [-0.298] 
Leverage 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.035*** 0.003 -0.022 
 [4.572] [4.619] [3.222] [0.282] [-1.492] 
Board independence -0.120 -0.073 0.040 0.219 -0.202 
 [-0.302] [-0.191] [0.092] [0.580] [-0.893] 
Board directors’ banking experience 0.196 0.138 0.207 0.369* 0.072 
[0.823] [0.565] [1.152] [1.772] [0.476] 
Block ownership dummy (20%) -0.072 -0.061 -0.014 0.045 -0.031 
[-0.633] [-0.509] [-0.110] [0.385] [-0.306] 
Inside owner -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.006 -0.002 
 [-0.589] [-0.141] [-0.931] [-1.171] [-0.508] 
Number of acquisitions 2003-06 0.035* 0.026 0.026 -0.011 -0.034* 
[1.830] [1.426] [1.064] [-0.902] [-1.869] 
HPD variable pay (as fraction of total pay) 0.060 0.011 0.120 -0.181 -0.293 
[0.170] [0.032] [0.491] [-0.837] [-1.160] 
Log total HPD pay 0.030 0.062 -0.044 0.035 0.025 
 [0.235] [0.579] [-0.511] [0.366] [0.296] 
State dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 248 246 236 239 126 
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Table X – Banks’ Non-Interest Income 
This table shows results of OLS regressions of the change of a banks’ log-ratio of non-interest income to net 
interest income between 2003 and 2006 on bank characteristics. The dependent variable is 
  (
                   
                   
)
  
    (
                   
                   
)
  
 
All the other variables are as in Table VI, but are based on 2003 values unless otherwise stated. Standard errors 
are clustered on state level. Robust t-statistics are in brackets. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 
(**), and 0.10 (*) levels. 
 
Independent Variable   
Dependent Variable:  
Change in non-interest income (2003-06) 
   (a) (b) 
Management Insulation Dummy-MID (2003)   -0.210*** -0.163*** 
  [-3.687] [-3.153] 
Change in management insulation (2003-06)   -0.041 -0.033 
  [-1.590] [-1.009] 
Log assets times small size dummy   0.117 0.154** 
   [1.672] [2.179] 
Log assets times medium size dummy   0.087 0.126* 
   [1.592] [1.785] 
Log assets times large size dummy   0.066* 0.095* 
   [1.802] [1.736] 
Leverage   -0.012** -0.007 
   [-2.117] [-0.386] 
Board independence   0.164 0.229 
   [0.650] [1.031] 
Board directors’ banking experience   -0.137 -0.229 
   [-0.532] [-1.002] 
Block ownership dummy (20%)   -0.006 -0.004 
   [-0.054] [-0.027] 
HPD variable pay (as fraction of total pay)    0.066 
    [0.245] 
Log total HPD pay    -0.029 
    [-0.457] 
     
State dummies   Yes Yes 
Observations   184 179 
R-squared   0.232 0.238 
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Table XI – Level 3 Assets 
This table shows results of OLS regressions of the percentage of assets classified as Level 3 assets on bank 
characteristics and the MII. The dependent variables are (a) Level 3 assets as a percentage of total assets in 2008 
and (b) the natural logarithm of Level 3 assets as a percentage of total assets in 2008 for the sub-sample of banks 
with non-zero Level 3 assets. All the other variables are as in Table VI. Standard errors are clustered on state 
level. Robust t-statistics are in brackets. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) 
levels. 
 
Independent Variable   Dependent Variable 
   
Proportion 
Level 3 
Assets 
Proportion 
Level 3 
Assets (log) 
   (a) (b) 
Management Insulation Dummy-MID (2003)   -0.512** -0.771* 
  [-2.640] [-1.764] 
Change in management insulation (2003-06)   0.119 0.193 
  [1.017] [0.928] 
Log assets times small size dummy   -0.087 0.242 
   [-0.420] [0.525] 
Log assets times medium size dummy   -0.079 0.162 
   [-0.440] [0.430] 
Log assets times large size dummy   -0.051 0.063 
   [-0.289] [0.186] 
Leverage   0.036 0.107** 
   [0.830] [2.143] 
Board independence   -1.153 1.180 
   [-1.366] [0.572] 
Board directors’ banking experience   -0.492 -1.219 
   [-0.592] [-0.737] 
Block ownership dummy (20%)   0.448* 0.718 
   [1.733] [0.885] 
HPD variable pay (as fraction of total pay)   -1.160** -1.944* 
   [-2.298] [-1.904] 
Log total HPD pay   0.716** 0.851* 
   [2.627] [1.814] 
     
State dummies   Yes Yes 
Observations   240 124 
R-squared   0.346 0.409 
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Figure 1 – The Management Insulation Index 
 
 
  
43 
 
 
 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Management Insulation Index 
Index Frequencies per Year, 2003-2007 
6
5
4
3
2
1
44 
 
Appendix – Detailed Description of the Management Insulation Index 
 
Index 
value 
Explanation 
6 
Corporations with an index value of 6 follow one of two “governance paths”. 
Path 1 (see boxes  1 - 2 - 4 - 8 - 10 – MII 6  in Figure 1 above) 
- The board is classified; 
- shareholders have no right to remove directors without cause; 
- the classification is contained in the corporation’s charter, meaning that a 
decision to declassify the board requires board approval; 
- shareholders are unable to gain control over the board by electing additional 
directors; 
- director nomination restriction determines whether the final outcome is MII5 
or MII6.  
Corporations with a board classification in their by-laws also fall into this 
category if an amendment of the bylaws is subject to board approval (this can be 
stated in the charter or be a default rule under state corporate law).
17
 
 
Path 2 (see boxes  1 - 2 - 4 - 5 - 7 - 8- 10 – MII 6  in Figure 1 above) 
- The board is classified; 
- shareholders have no right to remove directors without cause; 
- the classification of the board is not contained in the corporate charter, but in 
the by-laws; 
- shareholders can amend the by-laws to declassify the board; 
- following declassification the directors still cannot be removed without cause; 
- shareholders are unable to gain control over the board by electing additional 
directors; 
- director nomination restriction determines whether the final outcome is MII5 
or MII6.  
Assessment: 
The boards of banks with an index value of 6 enjoy the maximum amount of 
“insulation” from shareholder pressure. The board is classified, meaning that only 
                                                 
17
Where by-laws can be amended by shareholders, but only by supermajority vote, we proceeded as follows: If 
the supermajority is calculated based on all outstanding shares, we assumed that shareholders will not be able, in 
effect, to amend the by-laws against the will of the incumbent management. Where only shareholders present at 
the meeting count, we assumed that supermajority requirements above 66 2/3% (typically 80%) render it 
effectively impracticable to rely on changes to the corporation's by-laws in order to gain control over the board. 
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a third of the directors stand for re-election each year. Thus, it takes shareholders 
about two years (two meetings) to reverse the corporation’s strategy by gaining 
control over the board. 
We ignore special meeting rights for MII-5 and MII-6 banks: Shareholders can 
neither remove directors, nor add a relevant number of directors or declassify the 
board in a special meeting. Hence, we deem the existence of such a right to be 
irrelevant. 
As for restrictions to nominate directors:
18
 Such restrictions can limit the 
effectiveness of a proxy fight by giving the board enough time to react to activist 
shareholders. We note, however, that this is likely to be less relevant in MII-5 and 
MII-6 banks, since management is always secure for at least the time until the 
second-next general meeting, effectively always allowing for sufficient “response 
time”. Such provisions can result in a prolonged period of insulation even for 
classified boards, particularly where an activist period commences before an 
annual general meeting but after the advanced notice cut-off date. 
 
Index 
value 
Explanation 
5 
Banks with an index value of 5 are effectively a variation of MII-6 banks. They 
follow the same two “governance paths”, but there are no significant director 
nomination restrictions in place. 
Assessment: 
The absence of director nomination restrictions arguably slightly reduces the costs 
of gaining control over the board when compared to MII-6 banks. On the effect of 
such provisions on the difference in insulation between MII-5 and MII-6 banks 
see the MII-6 assessment above. 
 
 
4 
Corporations with an index value of 4 follow one of seven “governance paths”. 
Path 1 (see boxes  1 - 3 - 6 - 9 - 11 -  MII 4 ) 
- The board is not classified; 
- shareholders have no right to remove directors without cause; 
- but shareholders are able to gain control over the board by electing additional 
directors; 
- shareholders have no right to call a special meeting;19 
                                                 
18
  We define director nomination restrictions as legal arrangements that require more than 90 days advance 
notice for the nomination of directors by shareholders (and any rule more burdensome than this). 
19
  We treat the right to act by written consent (i.e. without a meeting) as equivalent to a special meeting right, 
unless acting without a meeting requires the written consent of the holders of all, or a supermajority of, 
outstanding shares. 
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- there are some director nomination restrictions in place. 
Path 2 (see boxes  1 - 3 - 6 - 11 -  MII 4 ) 
- The board is not classified; 
- shareholders have no right to remove directors without cause; 
- shareholders are unable to gain control over the board by electing additional 
directors; 
- there are some director nomination restrictions in place. 
Path 3 (see boxes  1 - 3 - 9 - 11-  MII 4 ) 
- The board is not classified; 
- shareholders have the right to remove directors without cause; 
- shareholders have no right to call a special meeting; 
- there are some director nomination restrictions in place. 
Path 4 (see boxes  1 - 2 - 9 - 11-  MII 4 ) 
- The board is classified; 
- nevertheless, shareholders have the right to remove directors without cause; 
- shareholders have no right to call a special meeting; 
- there are some director nomination restrictions in place. 
Path 5 (see boxes  1 - 2 - 4 - 5 - 7 - 9 - 11-  MII 4 ) 
- The board is classified; 
- shareholders have no right to remove directors without cause; 
- the classification of the board is not contained in the corporate charter, but in 
the by-laws; 
- shareholders can amend the by-laws to declassify the board; 
- the directors can now be removed without cause and are removed in the same 
meeting (presuming notice of removal has been given in accordance with the 
advanced notice bylaws); 
- shareholders have no right to call a special meeting; 
- there are some director nomination restrictions in place. 
Path 6 (see boxes  1 - 2 - 4 - 5 - 7 -8 - 9 - 11-  MII 4 )  
- The board is classified; 
- shareholders have no right to remove directors without cause; 
- the classification of the board is not contained in the corporate charter but in the 
by-laws; 
- shareholders can amend the by-laws to declassify the board; 
- the directors cannot now be removed without cause; 
- shareholders can, however, increase the size of the board to gain control; 
- shareholders have no right to call a special meeting; 
- there are some director nomination restrictions in place. 
Path 7 (see boxes  1 - 2 - 4 - 8 - 9 - 11 -  MII 4 ) 
- The board is classified; 
47 
 
- shareholders have no right to remove directors without cause; 
- the classification of the board is contained in the corporate charter; 
- shareholders can, however, increase the size of the board to gain control; 
- shareholders have no right to call a special meeting; 
- there are some director nomination restrictions in place. 
Assessment: 
Banks with a MII value of 4 differ significantly from MII-6 banks. Even though the 
board may be classified (Paths 4-7), shareholders can effectively gain control over 
the board within a year. As Path 4 shows, even where the board is classified it is 
possible that shareholders retain the right to remove directors without cause. This 
renders the board classification irrelevant. Even without such a removal right, some 
corporations provide for classified boards in their by-laws only, and allow their 
shareholders to amend the relevant provisions. This means that shareholders can 
simply declassify the board, rendering the insulation typically offered by staggered 
boards irrelevant where declassification results in the application of a without cause 
removal right (see Path 5). Note, however, that the declassification in itself does not 
typically affect the term of the incumbent directors.
20
 Furthermore, even where 
shareholders cannot remove directors without cause or declassify the board against 
the will of the management, shareholders are sometimes able to increase board size 
so as to outnumber the incumbent directors (Path 6 and 7). These three sets of 
                                                 
20
 In some States, for example New York and Texas the statute clarifies that a director's term of appointment is 
the term s/he was appointed for. § 703 New York Business Corporation Law provides for example that "each 
director shall hold office until the expiration of the  term for  which  he  is elected". In other jurisdictions, for 
example Delaware, the statute is unclear as to the effects of declassification on the director's term where that 
director was originally appointed for a three year term under a classified board structure. A case could be made 
that declassification alters the directors term (from three years to annual election), however, similarly a case 
could be made that the term is the term for which he/she was elected (i.e., for three years). The courts have not 
addressed this issue although the arguments made by the litigants in one case (Roven v Cotter 547 A.2d 603) 
assume the continued application of the three year term (in Delaware the issue is unlikely to be litigated given 
the application of a without cause removal right following declassification). Similar problems arise in other 
States that do not take the New York approach. On balance we think in the States that do not take the New York 
approach the argument for the continued applicability of the original (three year) term is the better position, 
although with respect to some States the answer may also depend on the exact wording of the relevant bylaws. 
The issue has similarly not been addressed in other States' case law.  For our purposes this is relevant in only 
one context where: (i) classification is in the by-laws; (ii) following declassification the removal right remains a 
with cause removal right; and (iii) the bank's articles or bylaws allow the shareholders to call an interim 
meeting. If courts in States that do not take the New York approach were to provide that declassification reduces 
a three year term to annual election at the annual general meeting then even in banks that, post-declassification, 
have a with cause removal right control could be obtained within a year by: (i) calling an interim meeting to 
declassify; and (ii) at the following annual general meeting removing the whole board. If, in contrast, the terms 
are unaffected by declassification then it will take approximately two years to obtain control of the board in 
these circumstances. Given this uncertainty in relation to States that do not take the New York approach we 
have elected to take the position that terms are unaffected by declassification in all States for the purposes of the 
Management Insulation Index. Importantly, for the purposes of our results taking the opposite view (that 
declassification results in annual election) does not affect the MID score of any bank in our sample. Any future 
use of the MII would however want to take this point into account.  
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governance provisions result in a level of entrenchment equivalent to some banks 
with unclassified boards and without cause removal rights (Path 3).  
3 
Banks with an index value of 3 are effectively a variation of MII-4 banks. They 
follow the same seven “governance paths”, but there are no significant director 
nomination restrictions in place. 
Assessment: 
Activist shareholders have to wait until the next general meeting to gain board 
control (see above). The absence of director nomination restrictions arguably 
slightly reduces the costs of gaining control over the board when compared to MII-4 
banks. 
2 
Banks with an index value of 2 follow one of six different “governance paths”. 
Path 1 (see boxes  1 - 2 - 9 - 12 -  MII 2 ) 
- The board is classified; 
- nevertheless, shareholders have the right to remove directors without cause; 
- shareholders have the right to call a special meeting; 
- there are some director nomination restrictions in place. 
Path 2 (see boxes  1 - 2 - 4 - 5 - 7 - 9 - 12-  MII 2 ) 
- The board is classified; 
- shareholders have no right to remove directors without cause; 
- the classification of the board is not contained in the corporate charter, but in 
the by-laws; 
- shareholders can amend the by-laws to declassify the board; 
- The directors can now be removed without cause; 
- shareholders have the right to call a special meeting; 
- there are some director nomination restrictions in place. 
Path 3 (see boxes  1 - 2 - 4 - 5 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 12-  MII 2 ) 
- The board is classified; 
- shareholders have no right to remove directors without cause; 
- the classification of the board is not contained in the corporate charter, but in 
the by-laws; 
- shareholders can amend the by-laws to declassify the board; 
- the directors cannot following declassification be removed without cause; 
- shareholders can, however, increase the size of the board to gain control; 
- shareholders have the right to call a special meeting; 
- there are some director nomination restrictions in place. 
Path 4 (see boxes  1 - 2 - 4 - 8 - 9 - 12-  MII 2) 
- The board is classified; 
- shareholders have no right to remove directors without cause; 
- the classification of the board is contained in the corporate charter; 
- shareholders can, however, increase the size of the board to gain control; 
- shareholders have the right to call a special meeting; 
- there are some director nomination restrictions in place. 
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Path 5 (see boxes  1 - 3 - 9 - 12-  MII 2) 
- The board is not classified; 
- shareholders have the right to remove directors without cause; 
- shareholders have the right to call a special meeting; 
- there are some director nomination restrictions in place. 
Path 6 (see boxes  1 - 3 - 6 - 9 - 12-  MII 2) 
- The board is not classified; 
- shareholders have no right to remove directors without cause; 
- shareholders can gain control over the board by increasing the size of the board; 
- shareholders have the right to call a special meeting; 
- there are some director nomination restrictions in place. 
Assessment: 
As with MII-4 banks, an MII value of 2 can be the result of very different looking 
governance arrangements. As we can see in Paths 1-4, even where the board is 
classified it is possible that shareholders can gain control over the board almost 
immediately. In Paths 1 and 2, the combination of special meeting rights and the 
ability to declassify the board or remove directors without cause renders the board 
classification irrelevant for entrenchment. Paths 3 and 4 describe a situation where 
shareholders of a corporation with a classified board can gain control via an increase 
of board size. These three sets of governance provisions result in a level of 
entrenchment equivalent to banks with unclassified boards, without cause removal 
rights, and without cause removal rights (Path 5). Even where no without cause 
removal right exists, shareholders can gain control over unclassified corporate 
boards before the next general meeting where they can increase board size in a 
special meeting (Path 6).  
Thus, the connecting characteristic of all MII-2 banks is the ability of shareholders 
to obtain control at a special meeting. Director nomination restrictions may slightly 
increase managerial insulation. 
1 
Banks with an index value of 1 are effectively a variation of MII-2 banks. They 
follow the same six “governance paths”, but there are no significant director 
nomination restrictions in place. 
Assessment: 
Activist shareholders can in principle gain control over the board almost 
immediately, as they are able to call a special meeting (see above). The absence of 
director nomination restrictions arguably slightly reduces the costs of gaining 
control over the board when compared to MII-2 banks. 
 
 
